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ETHICS AND THE SPINOZA REVIVAL.
BY VICTOR S. YARROS.
CONFUSION reigns in the modern world so far as ethical
problems are concerned. "The young", we are told, have
repudiated ethical standards and principles, and decline to be bound
by "the superstitions" of their parents. Everything is challenged,
doubted, put to the test of
—
^^no one knows what
!
In these circumstances it is perhaps not without significance
that an international society should have been founded at The Hague
for the distinct purpose of advancing the study and appreciation of
Spinoza's teachings. The moving spirits in this society believe that
Spinoza has a message for our own day, and that we, as well as
the younger generation, might well hark back to him. The society
proposes to publish an annual of original studies, as well as series
of books to be known as Bibliotheca Spinozana. Membership is
open to lay students and lovers of philosophy and high, serious
thinking.
The foregoing facts suggest a re-examination of Spinoza's
essential ideas and views. The task is worthy of scholars and
educated men of leisure. The present writer has no intention or
ambition to attempt any searching study of Spinoza, but he may
venture to offer certain summaries of the ethical discussions of the
great philosopher and logician, with some reflections, commentaries
and comparisons. May my slight effort stimulate more competent
writers to do more adequate and better work in the same fertile
field!
To begin with, Spinoza was a philosophical realist who saw
"life steadily and whole", in Matthew Arnold's phrase. He ap-
preciated the need of studying human nature in conduct and be-
havior, and he warned us neither to groan nor to exult over mani-
festations of human nature, but just simply to try to comprehend
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them. Such comprehension, in his judgment, was essential to any
real effort at correction of human faults and blunders. No phi-
losopher or ethicist dwelt more on "the guidance of reason", the
life of reason, the dictates of reason than did Spinoza, yet the
modern intellectualists cannot claim him as their authority or cite
him with any effect. He never overestimated the actual influence of
reason in the governance of the world.
Men, as a rule, says Spinoza, are governed in everything by
desire or lust; they are varied—for those are rare who live ac-
cording to the rules prescribed by reason—and, moreover, they
are generally envious and more prone to revenge than pity ; they
are ignorant, short-sighted and necessarily liable to emotions ; they
are drawn in different directions and are often contrary one to the
other; they are liable to emotions which far surpass human power
or virtue; they are guided by opinion rather than by reason, and
even the knowledge by them of good and evil often excites dis-
turbances in the mind and yields to all manner of sin and wicked-
ness. (Ethics, part four.)
If, then, men are thus inconstant, weak, the prey of passions
and emotions, how can the wise and chastened few cause them to
seek to live according to reason?
In answering this question Spinoza repeatedly admonishes us
to cultivate patience and charity toward poor, frail, errant human-
ity. Those, he says, who cavil at men and prefer to reprobate
vice instead of inculcating virtue, are a nuisance to themselves and
to others, and they do not help solidify the minds of men, but
rather to unloosen them. Here is a striking and edifying passage
:
"Let satirists laugh to their hearts' content at human affairs
let theologians revile them, and let the melancholy praise as much
as they can the rude and barbarous Hfe: let them despise men and
admire the brutes ; despite all this men will find that they can pre-
pare with mutual aid far more easily what they need, and avoid far
more the perils which beset them on all sides by united forces."
It is true, alas, that "he who increaseth knowledge increaseth
sorrow, or, as Ovid put it "Video meliora proboque, deteriora
sequor (The better I see and approve, the worse I follow)." But
to recognize these facts is not to despair of man, not to curse
God and die, not to talk idle nonsense with the Bernard Shaws and
Anatole Frances about the creation of man having been perpetrated
as a sort of grim joke. "It is, says Spinoza, "necessary to know
ourselves, to know both the power and want of power of our na-
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ture, so that we may determine what reason can do in the moderat-
ing of our desires and what it cannot."
This passage should be pondered by the cynics, pessimists and
superficial moralists.
What is, or should be, our social ideal, our goal? Spinoza's
answer is clear and firm.
He begins by pointing out that, "since reason postulates noth-
ing against nature, it postulates, therefore, that each man should
love himself and seek what is useful to him"—that is, what is truly
useful to him—and "that each man should endeavor to preserve his
being as far as it in him lies, and should desire all that leads him to
a greater state of perfection." He then proceeds to argue that
"there is nothing more useful to man than man." While envy,
jealously, antipathy, suspicion divide men, the fact remains that
they cannot lead solitary lives, cannot dispense with social organ-
ization, and cannot renounce fellowship and co-operation without
sacrificing much that they value and cherish. It is obvious that
man is a social animal, and the question is to what extent his good
coincides with the common good. Spinoza says
:
"Nothing can be desired by men more excellent for their self-
preservation than that all with all should so agree that they com-
pose the minds of all into one mind, and the bodies of all into one
body, and all endeavor at the same time as much as possible to
preserve their being, and all seek at the same time what is useful
to them all as a body. From which it follows that men who are
governed by reason—that is, men who under the guidance of rea-
son seek what is useful to them—desire nothing for themselves
which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, and there-
fore they are Just, faithful and honorable."
Here what we call altruism is frankly based on rational ego-
ism. Spinoza insists that no virtue can be conceived as prior to
the virtue of preserving oneself, and that the more one endeavors
and succeeds in preserving one's own essence—the desire of living
well, acting well, being blessed that essence—the more virtue
he has. But an enlightened egoism imperceptibly and naturally
shades into and assumes the character of altruism. Hatred and
malice are not conducive to the preservation of one's essence, to
the state of contentment and blessedness. Peace, friendship, co-
operation are conducive to such states, and man's reason has no
difficulty in finding out that truth. Hence it is idle to say that men
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must continue to fight one another, to commit racial suicide, as it
were, or to poison and destroy their better selves, their essence.
If men desire to live in concord and be of help to each other
—
and if they are reasonable they must desire this, for the sake of
their individual security and happiness—that they must give up
their natural rights, render themselves reciprocally secure, and
determine to do nothing that will be injurious to another, continues
Spinoza, and thus society, or the state, as an organized entity is
brought into existence under a sort of tacit social contract. The
individual does not sacrifice himself in becoming a citizen ; his
reason tells him that, on the contrary, he gains very decided ad-
vantages from the status of citizen or member of an organized com-
munity. True, he may at times be tempted to injure some one, to
cominit a wrong, but he must realize in his sober moment that
restraint, discipline and prevention of anti-social conduct are legiti-
mate and necessary.
Advocates of non-resistance to evil and aggression will find no
support in Spinoza's teaching. And, although from a superficial
point of view, such advocates may be said to cherish a deeper faith
in human reason and human nature than that exhibited by their
opponents, the truth is that the gospel of non-resistance is repug-
nant to sound psychology or a real understanding of human con-
duct. Spinoza, assuredly, will not be charged with contempt for
reason and intellect. Yet the modern intellectualists may learn
from him that undue trust in reason and enlightened self-interest is
as unscientific, unphilosophical as it is contrary to the common
sense of the average man.
In psychology, indeed, Spinoza was extraordinarily "modern."
He did not share the error that so many of our half-baked reform-
ers fall into when they assert or imply that evil and injustice can
be eradicated by one-sided education, by logical demonstrations.
Again and again he argues that an emotion cannot be checked by a
mere idea, an argument, a demonstration addressed to the intellect.
Here are far-reaching and pregnant propositions
:
"An emotion can neither be hindered nor removed save by a
contrary emotion and one stronger in checking emotion."
"An emotion whose cause we imagine to be with us at the
present is stronger than if we did not imagine it to be present."
"The knowledge of good or evil is nothing else than the emo-
tion of pleasure or pain in so far as we are conscious of it."
"A true knowledge of good and evil cannot restrain any emo-
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tion in so far as the knowledge is true, but only in so far as it is
considered as an emotion."
"The desire which arises from the knowledge of good and
evil, in so far as this knowledge has reference to the future, can
more easily be checked or destroyed than the desire of things which
are pleasing in the present."
The "intellectualists" who fail to reckon with the emotions,
passions and appetites of man, and the Utopian reformers who
expect to revolutionize industry and politics by appeals to Reason,
or to Enlightened Self-interest, should anxiously consider the bear-
ing of the foregoing proposition (Spinoza's Ethics, Part 4) on
the problems they are seeking to evolve and on the assumptions that
underlie the alleged solutions favored by them. The reformer should
first of all study psychology. It is idle to expect the impossible of
mankind. It is idle to suppose that a world governed by passion
and emotion can be profoundly modified by speculations or abstract,
fanciful theories concerning future social arrangements.
Two conclusions may be drawn from Spinoza's chain of prop-
ositions. One he, in fact, draws himself—namely, that society is
held together by the law, or fact, that "every one refrains from in-
flicting evil through fear of greater evil", and that the State or
organized society must make its commands respected and obeyed
"by threats", rather than by reason.
The second conclusion is that, while threats and fear are
tolerably effective in checking anti-social impulses and emotions,
and in thus promoting order and harmony, exclusive trust in
threats and fear would be unwise and unphilosophical. For, as
Spinoza recognizes, "the harmony or peace that is born of fear is not
trustworthy." The things that give birth to enduring harmony and
peace, he says, "are those which have reference to justice, equity
and honorable dealing." It follows, therefore, that society and its
individual members ought to strive in every fruitful way to make
justice, equity and honorable dealing something more than ideas,
intellectual conceptions. Men and women must be so trained
guided, educated and inspired that greed, narrow selfishness,
cruelty, envy and injustice will arouse strong emotions in them and
prompt them to fight for righteousness and justice. They must
somehow be educated emotionally and morally, as well as intel-
lectually. They must be gently led to fall in love with everything
that is good, lovely and of fair repute.
How are these necessary results to be brought about? The
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question is a difficult one, but it must be faced and answered. The
intellectualists have shirked this task, and are still shirking it. The
conventional and superficial moralists have much to say about the
duty of the schools, churches, the press, the theater and other great
institutions to inculcate mercy, simplicity, love and other virtues,
but it is well known that they have not found the means of success-
fully doing so. Sermons and didacting lessons leave most of us cold.
Children are repelled rather than attracted by the type and sort of
text-books or addresses on civics and morals which are inflicted
upon them in the schools by dull boards and routine-ridden super-
intendents and principals.
Precept needs the re-enforcement of example, of conduct seen,
read of, admired day by day. Parents, neighbors, teachers, social
leaders must practice the virtues they would inculcate. The whole
social atmosphere must reflect and illustrate the doctrine professed
in books and in sermons. "Lives" of noble men and women, of
heroes and martyrs, of single-minded reformers, must be placed
in the hands of the young at a most impressionable age, and the
"lives" should be written by literary artists, not by hacks. Books
often produce deep, lasting impressions on young people and shape
or color their lives to the very end. But this happens only when
the books delight, thrill and fascinate, and when they are given or
lent by persons who know how to inspire afTection and admiration.
Here is one apt illustration of the point in question. The writer
has just heard the following story: A man prominent in political
and pubHc life, a "progressive" and independent of courage and
insight, was asked by a friend how he came to identify himself with
unpopular causes, with radical legislation, with policies feared and
condemned by most of his fellow-partisans and professional asso-
ciates. He answered the inquiry by saying that while his parents
and their neighbors had been conservative and "respectable", he had
been fortunate, as a boy, to make the acquaintance of an "infidel
shoemaker", an old man of mild manners and pleasing appearance.
The shoemaker was a philosopher and a scholar. He gave his young
friends books that were not known in orthodox circles—Buckle,
Spencer, Owen, Godwin, Haeckel, Thoreau, Emerson. The books
were devoured and secretly worshipped. The effect they had was
never effaced. Their influence made for tolerance, liberalism, sym-
pathy with suffering, a longing for a better, freer and pleasanter
world. But the same books from another source might have totally
failed to stir and charm the bov. The old "infidel shoemaker", the
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modest philosopher, by the magic of personality, translated ideas
into warm sentiments and emotions.
It is unfortunate that Spinoza, whose intellect was so powerful,
failed to pursue the inquiry into the sound and effective method of
re-enforcing mere ideas and opinions with appropriate emotions
sufficiently strong to check and counteract the anti-social passions
and emotions of man. But all that he has said on the subject is,
to repeat, extraordinarily modern, consonant with the "new psy-
chology", the ''new education" and the new sociology. We are
told by the most philosophical educators that the main task of the
schools, colleges and universities is "to socialize the individual",
to adapt him more and more to the true, co-operative, harmonious
commonwealth. But how do those institutions socialize their
charges? Alas, they graduate many snobs, egotists, cynics, pessi-
mists and brutes. The effect avowedly sought is seldom obtained.
Education will have to be reformed and reorganized. The home
—
once a civilizing and socializing influence—must also be reclaimed
and adapted to new conditions. Personality, example, leadership,
inspiration, emulation are severally factors in character-building
which the modern world, thanks to the intellectualists, the economic
materialists, the champions of mere "strength" and the other ob-
scurantists, has almost neglected and despised. The Spinoza revival
should help to recall us to essential truths of ethics and social
psychology.
